ABSTRACT An outsourcing re-encryption program can help a ciphertext owner (delegator) transform his/her ciphertext into another ciphertext of delegatee. For example, an e-mail receiver can re-transfer an encrypted e-mail to his secretary while allowing the e-mail to be readable for her. For a multi-hop re-encryption, the delegatee can re-encrypt the ciphertext to another user in delegation chain, repeatedly. Traditionally, this transformation is usually conducted by a proxy or an outsourcing server. However, the proxy or outsourcing server needs a re-encryption key (i.e., re-key) and the re-encryption program must execute in a black-box manner (cannot trace into or debug and monitor the program), and thus the outsource server must be semi-trusted. Actually, as the outsource program was run and fully controlled by the server, in this paper, we consider a stronger attack in the case that the re-encryption program was run on an untrusted/malicious server and even the server can trace into the codes and monitor the variables during the executing. We design a secure multi-hop re-encryption scheme, and then convert the re-encryption program into an obfuscated version with constant-hiding to ensure no sensitive information be revealed. The obfuscator of multi-hop re-encryption is to faithfully hide the program and its sensitive data that takes a re-encryption program/circuit as input and outputs another program with the same functionality, while revealing no more sensitive information (i.e., sensitive key and plaintext) than learns from the blackbox oracle access to the original program. We also present a flexible and controllable construction of re-encryption scheme, functionality model and its obfuscation version in leveled multilinear groups, and exemplify some scenarios to deploy in various applications. Finally, we provide the performance analysis of the obfuscator, such as functionality preservation of consistency, polynomial slowdown of performance, and average-case virtual black-box of security, and show that the obfuscator is efficient and practical in use.
I. INTRODUCTION
In proxy re-encryption (PRE) schemes, the proxy should be semi-trusted so that it will neither leak the sensitive data or secret information, nor trace into the running program to monitor the executing maliciously. However, the proxy might obtain partial secret key from the re-encryption key (i.e., re-key) in the system, especially after colluding with the others [2] , [27] . Providing an efficient re-encryption mechanism against malicious proxy in cryptosystems is an important and challenging work, and it has many appealing applications in outsourcing the re-encryption program in (untrusted) cloud servers [27] , [35] . Traditionally, most re-encryption schemes are single-hop, in the sense that the ciphertext of delegatee is of a different form to the delegator and cannot be re-encrypted anymore [2] , [5] , [22] , [25] , [32] . For example, a ciphertext might not be re-encrypted from user i to j, and then be re-encrypted again from user j to k and so forth. Currently, there is no known unidirectional and transitive-multi-hop proxy re-encryption scheme, and Libert and Vergnaud [25] showed an open problem to answer whether such constructions are possible.
In this work, we give an affirmative answer for the construction of unidirectional and multi-hop re-encryption, and pay further attention to the outsourcing multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption mechanism run on an untrusted server (not necessarily semi-trusted), in which the sensitive information including the underlying plaintext and the secret keys is protected when the re-encryption program is oursourced to an untrusted server [20] . We also demonstrate that the multi-hop is easy-to-control for the number and the depth of delegation.
A. MOTIVATION
In this work, we consider a scenario of outsoucing a multihop re-encryption program on an untrusted server described in Fig. 1 : Suppose that customer Alice is on her vacation, and Alice delegates Bob to read and deal with all her sensitive encrypted emails. As Alice cannot read the email, then she requests an outsource server Zola (namely email gateway) to transform (re-encrypt) Alice's encrypted email to Bob. During the transformation, Zola needs a re-key rk Alice→Bob generated by Alice, which is sensitive since the re-key includes the information of secret key of Alice. Thus the outsourcing server Zola must be semi-trusted. Furthermore, when Bob finds out that he cannot deal with the email, and needs the help of Carol, he also requests the server Zola to transform the encrypted email to the readable form by Carol.
Meanwhile, Zola also needs a re-key rk Bob→Carol generated by Bob. Obviously, this forms the chain-based delegation of the re-encryption email. We now consider that the outsourcing server Zola is malicious, that is, Zola can feed into the re-encryption program and even sets and traces the breakpoints during the program running. We require that, under the white-box access to the re-encryption program, the malicious server cannot gain any sensitive information about the secret key and underlying plaintext.
In order to achieve the privacy and confidentiality of re-encryption program, we use the technique of constanthiding obfuscation to prevent the server from capturing the sensitive data (i.e., secret key and plaintext) used in the program. Actually, unlike (strong) virtual black-box requirement, we only consider the sensitive data protection instead of protecting total re-encryption program. On the contrary, we allow the adversary (i.e., untrusted server) to know the flowchart and algorithm of re-encryption algorithm. In fact, for a provably secure cryptography scheme, the algorithm must be public and thus the functionality of the algorithm is known to the server [33] .
Actually, an encryption might slow down a program a little, however for an obfuscation, it slows down a lot, especially for the candidate implementation of all circuits in [15] . Barak et al . [5] demonstrated that we cannot obtain a generic obfuscation for all circuits or programs in the (strong) virtual black-box security. This leads to inefficiently design an obfuscator for all functionalities. We then aim at the concrete functionality (re-encryption functionality in this paper) and provide a more efficient and practical obfuscation construction.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Unlike a one-hop re-encryption, the input and output of a multi-hop re-encryption ciphertext should have the same structure to allow for cascading delegation, i.e. taking a delegation ciphertext and re-encrypting it, repeatedly.
In order to allow the multi-hop re-encryption program to be run on any (untrusted) outsourcing server, this paper formalizes the definition and security notion of controllable multi-hop re-encryption and its obfuscation construction. Our contribution is described as follows: 1) We give the model and definition of controllable multihop re-encryption scheme MUREnc, which achieves the properties such as unidirectional re-encryption, flexible depth control etc. We also illustrate several scenarios to support different applications. 2) In order to prevent the sensitive leakage from the re-encryption program running on an untrusted sever, we define a probabilistic polynomial-time function of re-encryption, and give us the security model of obfuscating re-encryption functionality. Concretely, we require that, even the untrusted server has the ability to access the obfuscated program with a whitebox manner (for example, hack into the program, watch or debug the breakpoint), the server gains no more sensitive information from the obfuscated re-encryption program than having access to the original program with black-box manner. We also guarantee that the output of obfuscated re-encryption program and the output of original program are the (extremely probabilistic) same when taking the same inputs, which obtains the functionality-preserving of the obfuscation. 3) We design an obfuscator MUREncObf that implements the re-encryption functionality, and also analyze the correctness of functionality preservation, efficiency of polynomial slowdown, and security of average-case virtual black-box. Explicitly, under the white-box oracle access to the obfuscation program, the obfuscator MUREncObf has the following properties: 1) Functionality Preservation: The output of obfuscator has the same results as the output of the original re-encryption program when taking the same input.
2) Controllable Multi-Hop: A delegator allows his ciphertext to be transformed to the form of the other user in a controllable manner: he can decide the number of re-encrypting hop for his ciphertext. Especially, zerohop allows the ciphertext to be decrypted by himself, one-hop permits the ciphertext to be re-encrypted only once, and the number of controllable multi-hop can be decided by the delegator when generating a controllable-depth re-key. 3) Unidirectionality: Bidirectional re-encryption considers that the trust and delegation is bidirectional, however, user j trusts user j (j can gain access to i's confidential data) does not guarantee that user i has the same power to obtain j's confidential data (especial in cascading delegation chain-based framework). We consider the re-encryption to be unidirectional, i.e., allowing for a ciphertext transferred from user i to j but not reverse. 4) Plaintext Hiding: During the white-box run of obfuscated re-encryption program, the underlying plaintext is perfectly hidden for the program server/executor even the server can trace into the program. 5) Delegator Secret-Key Hiding: The re-key embeds the delegator's secret key, and will be used in the re-encryption program. Evan colluding with the others but not the delegatee, the sever cannot recover the delegator's secret key. In our scheme, the size of the input ciphertext is constant and then efficient, i.e., only three elements for any depth ciphertext, and all re-encryption ciphertexts have the same form. The comparison of related works is listed in Tab. 1.
C. OVERVIEW OF THE SCHEME
The re-encryption algorithm outputs a transformed ciphertext when taking as input an original ciphertext and a rekey. The re-key is generated by the delegator using his secret key and the delegatee's public key. Also, the delegator compiles and obfuscates the re-encryption program taking the re-key as hardwired input, and sends the obfuscated program to the (untrusted) server. In the construction, to obtain flexible delegation depth, we devise all re-keys and ciphertexts with the same structure so that the multi-hop re-encryption delegation is feasible, efficient, and easy-to-implement. Obfuscating a re-encryption algorithm/circuit is to design a compiler with respect to a class of circuits. When given a ciphertext ct i under public key pk i , a trivial algorithm of re-encryption is to decrypt the ciphertext using delegator's secret key sk i and then re-encrypts the underlying plaintext under public key pk j , and then outputs the ciphertext of pk j . Obviously, this re-encryption program should be run by user i since the transformation needs the secret key sk i to decrypt the original ciphertext. At the same time, user i can decrypt the ciphertext and then knows the encapsulated plaintext.
Practical Re-Encryption Functionality: We now consider the re-encryption that is run by a (semi-trusted) server. At first, the delegator i generates a re-key rk i→j for the server, and the server uses this key as input to call the re-encryption program ReEnc and then converts any ciphertext of user i to the one of user j. Ideally, we require that the obtainable information of the server is indistinguishable from the information in idealized re-encryption functionality. However, in a traditional proxy re-encryption, it is impossible to obtain the indistinguishability.
Obfuscator Design: To avoid the distinguishability of the re-encryption in the above model, as mentioned earlier, we convert the semi-trusted re-encryption program into an obfuscated version. We require that the obfuscated program has the same functionality with the original program. In order to obtain a secure obfuscator for re-encryption program, we firstly design a semantically secure re-encryption scheme, and give the formal security proof for the scheme. We also require that the structures of the re-key to support the obfuscatable design, and the structure of ciphertext to support multi-hop. Then, we define the approximately learnable functionality of re-encryption that describes as a probabilistic circuit family C λ . The technological roadmap of designing an obfuscating transitive-multi-hop re-encryption program is described as follows: 1)
Step 1: Design a semantically secure transitive-multihop re-encryption scheme MUREnc = (Init, KeyGen, Enc, ReKey, ReEnc); 2)
Step 2: Prove the security of MUREnc under the black-box oracle access to the re-encryption program. Note that we need to prove the security for both original ciphertext and transformed re-encryption ciphertext; 3)
Step 3: Define the functionality of re-encryption, and its probabilistic circuit family; 4)
Step 4: Design the obfuscator algorithm that taking as input a random instance of probabilistic circuit family, hardwired information and auxiliary information;
5)
Step 5: Analyze the obfuscator's properties such as functionality preservation, polynomial slowdown performance, and prove the average-case black-box security, that is, if there exists an adversary that breaks the security with access to obfuscated program, then there exists another algorithm that solves the security of original re-encryption program with black-box access to the program. We use a distinguisher to differ the distributions, and show that the advantage of distinguisher is negligible. Controllable Multi-Hop: We observe that our transitivemulti-hop re-encryption scheme is a natural extension of one-hop re-encryption in bilinear maps. In order to obtain the multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption, we use the multilinear map to obtain delegation depth control. As the unidirectional evaluation of multilinear maps (i.e., G i+j is evaluated from the pairing of G i and G j , but invertible), then the delegation chain of re-encryption and re-key are also unidirectional. To achieve the flexible control of the delegation, we use three flags v, u and w to denote the depth in encryption, re-key and re-encryption, respectively. The initial public key and secret key stay at group G 1 , the message stays at group G n . The re-key and re-encryption ciphertext stay at G i (2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) w.r.t the delegation depth of re-key and re-encryption. We ensure that u+v+w ≤ n−1, which means that the maximum delegation depth is n − 1. In Section III-B, based on our scheme, we provide some practical deployments and scenarios to adapt to different application environments. In the decryption, we use the multilinear pairing evaluation of (re-)key and (re-)ciphertext to cancel out the randomness and then extracts the plaintext.
Average-Case Virtual Black-Box Security: As our goal of obfuscation is mainly to protect the privacy of sensitive constants such as secret key and plaintext, we prove the security of obfuscation in the average-case black-box model, in which the input circuit is randomly selected from a family of circuits and the output is its obfuscated version. Implicitly, the random selection of a circuit with respect to the random selection of cryptographic keys. In order to obtain the proof of average-case black-box security, we use a distinguisher D in Definition 4 to differ two computationally indistinguishable distributions from family C λ . One distribution is the output of adversary which takes input the obfuscated circuit O(C) (access to obfuscated circuit O(C) with the whitebox manner) and some auxiliary information, and the other distribution is the output of simulator which has the black-box oracle to circuit C (access to circuit C with black-box manner, i.e., only obtains the input/output behavior of the circuit). In the formal security proof, we give two games Nice and Junk, in which the distribution of the former is identical to the output distribution of obfuscation circuit O(C) and the distribution of the later is identical to the output of simulator S. Finally, we prove the computational indistinguishability of Nice and Junk under the intraceable assumption in multilinear groups.
D. RELATED WORK
Implementing a leveled multilinear map is introduced into cryptography in 2013, and it provided a useful tool for constructing functional encryption [9] , fully homomorphic encryption and obfuscation [9] , [10] , [15] , [16] . Garg et al. [15] introduced a new model, i.e., combining graded encoding scheme, complex jigsaw mechanism and fully homomorphic encryption, to give a candidate obfuscator for indistinguishability obfuscation for all circuits. Later, Brakerski and Rothblum [7] also proposed a new generalpurpose obfuscator for all polynomial size circuits, in which they uses graded encoding schemes under the generalization of multilinear maps. However, as the scheme needs (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption to implement the obfuscation, so they are much inefficient. Zimmerman [35] gave an obfuscation scheme for general program that uses a straightline program to describe arithmetic circuit and thus does not impose the transformation of inefficient matrix branch programs and the scheme was constructed in composite-order multilinear groups. In order to construct more efficient obfuscators, some slight weak and practical obfuscations were proposed [18] , [23] , [35] .
The definition of average-case virtual secure obfuscation is first given by Hohenberger et al. [22] , which can solve the impossibility of predicate black-box security for larger cryptographic system. Average-case secure obfuscation ensures that, provided a cryptographic scheme has the distinguishability property, if there exists an adversary against a cryptographic protocol when given access to an obfuscated program then there exists an adversary with blackbox access to the original program with similar probability. Obfuscation is a very useful tool for the construction of many new cryptographic primitives [21] . A prominent example is functional encryption for all circuits, and then provides strong access control properties in distributed systems [10] , [15] . Shi et al. [29] proposed an obfuscatable designated verifier signature scheme in the average-case virtual black-box security.
A natural paradigm of re-encryption mechanism is proxy re-encryption, in which a semi-trusted proxy performs the re-encryption program using the re-encryption key [2] , [24] , [27] , [30] . Compared with obfuscating re-encryption, proxy re-encryption cannot achieve the obfuscator's security level, since the (untrusted) proxy can gain some non-black-box information about the delegator's re-encryption secret key, especially when the re-encryption program is run in white-box manner.
Several one-hop re-encryption schemes and the obfuscation were proposed in [22] . In some of multi-hop (non-transitive) re-encryptions, the ciphertext size and the decryption complexity grow linearly in the number of re-encryption hops [9] . In the scheme of [24] , although the ciphertext is constant, however, the re-encryption is bidirectional. In [28] , Nuñez et al. proposed an efficient proxy re-encryption in NRTU.
E. ROADMAP
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we provide some notations, primitives and definitions that will be used in this paper. In Section III, we give the definition, security model, and construction of controllable multihop re-encryption scheme, and also analyze the security. Furthermore, we provide some deployments of our scheme to satisfy different application needs. In Section IV, we present the model and definition of re-encryption functionality and circuit, and in Section V, we propose the concrete construction for obfuscating the re-encryption algorithm, and give the performance analysis and security proof in Section VI. Finally, in Section VII, we draw the conclusion of the work.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. MEANINGFUL NOTATIONS AND TERMS
Unless specified otherwise, we denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter and by 1 λ its unary representation. Let Z be the set of integers and Z p be the ring modulo p. Let [n] be the set {1, 2, · · · , n} and [n, m] be the set {n, n + 1, · · · , m}. We use the term p.p.t to denote a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm. A function is negligible in λ (denoted µ(λ)) if it is smaller than the inverse of any polynomial, for all large enough value of λ ∈ N. We use (A, B) to denote the statistical distance of two random variables A and B.
In this paper, we assume that the computation for describing program is encoded into the family of polynomial-sized circuit. A class of circuits is of the form {C n } n∈N , where C n denotes a set of polynomial-size circuits with input length l in (n) and output length l out (n), and l in (n) and l out (n) are polynomial in n, respectively. For a circuit C ∈ C n , let C(x; r) be a probabilistic circuit running C with random coin r on regular input x ∈ {0, 1} n , and C r ← C n be a randomly sampled circuit C from family C n .
We denote O(C) as an obfuscator of C that takes a circuit C as input and outputs a same functional circuit. We denote A and S as an adversary algorithm and a simulator algorithm respectively, and use S C (·) to denote S having a black-box oracle access to circuit C.
B. DEFINITION OF OBFUSCATION
An obfuscator for a class of circuits C n is a p.p.t algorithm that takes as input a circuit C ∈ C n and outputs an unintelligible circuit O(C). The formal definition of provably secure obfuscation is given as follows:
Definition 1 (Obfuscation): A uniform p.p.t algorithm O is called an obfuscator for a function/circuit family C n , if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) (Functionality Preservation:) There exists a negligible function µ(k) such that for any C ∈ C n and all input
where t denotes the worst-case running time or the size of circuit C. i.e.,
3) (Virtual Black-Box Security): For any p.p.t algorithm A, there exists a p.p.t simulator S such that for all C ∈ C,
where the probabilities are taken over the random selection circuit C from C n , and the random coins of A and S.
In the security of virtual black-box access to the circuit C, to avoid the worst-case impossibility of obfuscation in (3), we consider the average-case virtual black-box property such that the simulator S can only simulate the output for a random function in the circuit family C n . Actually, our goal is to protect the secret key used in the re-encryption program run in a white-box access such as tracing into the program or monitoring the executing. As the secret keys are randomly selected and uniformly distributed, and the average-case security is enough for the obfuscation. Concretely, the average-case security under the virtual black-box access is defined as: for large enough λ, every polynomial-size auxiliary input aux, there exists a p.p.t distinguisher D,
In (4), for a randomly sampled circuit C, the information of adversary A obtaining from the obfuscated circuit O(C) can also be mounted by a simulator S with oracle access to the input/output behavior of C, and the distinguisher D cannot identify them.
C. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
Multilinear groups (i.e., groups with an n-linear map for n > 2), which also known as graded multilinear maps or graded encodings, have been considered in a number of works both for functionality and for security reason [12] , [15] , [16] .
be a sequence of groups each of large prime order p, and g 1 , g 2 , · · · , g n be the canonical generators of G 1 , G 2 , · · · , G n respectively, and set g = g 1 and g = (g 1 , g 2 , · · · , g n ). For a set of efficiently computable bilinear Obviously, for all h j ∈ G i j and
We use MG(1 λ , n) to denote a p.p.t algorithm to generate the instance of multilinear groups, in which λ is the security parameter, i.e., p ≥ 2 λ , and n is the maximum depth of pairing operations, i.e., ( G, p, g, e) ← MG(1 λ , n).
Garg et al. [16] gave the definition of an approximate version of a multilinear group family that uses the technique of graded encoding systems. The multilinear groups have the following computationally infeasible assumptions.
Definition 3 (Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption, k-MDDH Assumption) [16] : Given a tuple 
Actually, the MDDDH assumption is a variant (i.e., k = 2) of decisional divisible Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDDH assumption) in bilinear groups [3] . Concretely, DDDH implies MDDDH. We obtain g
III. MULTI-HOP AND UNIDIRECTIONAL RE-ENCRYPTION A. MODEL AND CONSTRUCTION

Definition 6 (Multi-hop and Unidirectional Re-encryption Scheme, MUREnc):
A multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption scheme MUREnc is defined as a tuple MUREnc = (Init, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, ReKey, ReEnc) of six algorithms:
Taking as input the security parameter λ and the maximum delegation depth n, this algorithm is performed by the trusted authority to output the system parameter pp. Note that pp is public and all other algorithms implicitly include it. 2) [sk i , pk i ] ← KeyGen(i): The key generation algorithm is called by user i that outputs a secret/public key pair
The encryption algorithm is performed by a sender and outputs a ciphertext ct [v] i that taking as input a public key pk i , a level label v and a message M ∈ M. 4) M ← Dec(v, ct [v] i , sk i ): The decryption algorithm outputs the plaintext when taking as input a valid secret key and an v-depth ciphertext. [u] i→j ← ReKey(u, sk i , pk j ): The algorithm outputs a u-th level re-key rk [u] i→j that taking as input a level node label u, a delegator's secret key sk i and a delegatee's public key pk j . 6) ct
5) rk
i ): Taking as input a u-level re-key, a v-level ciphertext and a control depth w, the re-encryption algorithm outputs a transformed (u + v + w)-th level ciphertext. Note that the re-encryption transformation is to convert a ciphertext of user i into a ciphertext of user j with the restriction that the transformed depth of a ciphertext does not exceed the maximum depth n−1. The illustration of workflow and modules of scheme MUREnc is described in Fig. 2 Remark 1: Note that the message space is G n , the key space is G 1 and the re-key space is defined in {G i } i∈ [2,n−1] . A secret key owner can delegate the decryptable re-encryption ciphertext with at most depth (n − 1)-hop. In this case, the re-encryption chain is proceeded as ReEnc(1, rk [1] 1→2 , ct [1] 1 ) → ReEnc(2, rk [2] 2→3 , ct [2] 2 ) → · · ·
→ ReEnc(n − 1, rk
Remark 2: As the one-way evaluation of multilinear map, the re-encryption is also unidirectional.
Remark 3: Let rk 
where k = u + v + w. The output of re-encryption algorithm ReEnc has identical distribution to the output of encryption algorithm Enc . Explicitly, we can re-randomize a re-encryption ciphertext by selecting a randomness r ← Z p randomly, and calculating and outputting
We use Re-randomize(ct) to denote the above rerandomized procedure that produces a same distributed ciphertext as before. Note that we will use the Re-randomize(·) algorithm to re-randomize an output ciphertext in the concrete constructions. We give the construction of MUREnc in Fig. 3 . 
B. CONSISTENCY AND DEPLOYMENT
In this section, we give the correctness and consistency analysis of the scheme, and then provide the flexible solutions for the deployments in practical applications.
1) CORRECTNESS AND CONSISTENCY
Theorem 1:
The scheme MUREnc is correct.
Proof: We consider the correctness and consistency of three types of ciphertexts: zero-hop ciphertext (without re-encryption), one-hop ciphertext and multi-hop ciphertext. It is easily to see that all ciphertexts have the same structure and identical distribution. Actually, the ciphertext is a variant of Elgamal encryption [13] in multilinear groups.
For a zero-hop ciphertext ct [v] = [v, g
and a secret key sk = x i , the decryption is calculated by
For a one-hop ciphertext: On receiving a ciphertext ct
As the level of re-encryption ciphertext is n − 1, obviously, it cannot be re-encrypted anymore.
A re-encryption ciphertext has the form ct
, which is a k-level valid ciphertext of user j and has the same distribution with the ciphertext output by Enc algorithm, and the decryption is also consistent by calculating c 2 e(c 1 , g n−k ) −1/sk j → M . Also, we can transform the k-level ciphertext into a deeper delegation, i.e., for adding k -hop, set
, and e is defined as e : G × · · · × G → G (i.e., self-pairing) and multilinear maps can be obtained by iterating the self-pairing, then all keys and ciphertexts stay at G 1 . In this case, the encryption is a variant of Elgamal encryption [13] . If n = 3 and e is a type-2 bilinear map, that is e : G 1 × G 2 → G 3 , then the ciphertext is an Elgamal-like encryption in bilinear groups. It is easily to see that, in this case, it can only provide one-hop re-encryption functionality in bilinear group model [2] , [25] .
2) CONTROLLABLE DEPLOYMENTS OF THE SCHEME
We now provide the practical and controllable deployments of the scheme to satisfy the different requirements. As both the re-keys and the re-encryption ciphertexts stay in some G k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, we employ the level labels, v in initial ciphertext, u in re-key and w in re-encryption ciphertext, to flexibly and controllably deploy the scheme by setting these parameters.
1) (Zero-Hop Deployment): If a user does not allow his ciphertext to be re-encrypted, he sets the encryption algorithm with maximum level v = n − 1. That is, the ciphertext has the form ct = [n − 1, g xr n−1 , Mg r n ]. The deployment of zero-hop re-encryption is shown in Fig. 4 . 2) (One-Hop Deployment): If a delegator i of pk i allows re-encryption for delegatee pk j using his re-key only once, i.e., one-hop, he can generate a re-key for user j as rk i.e., by setting u = n − 2. As the unidirectional of the delegation, and the original ciphertext v ≥ 1, and in this case the allowable re-encryption level w = n − u − v < 2. The user j can re-encrypt the ciphertext at most one time. The deployment of one-hop scheme is shown in Fig. 5 . 
3) (Multi-Hop Deployment):
The maximum allowable delegation depth is n − 1. That is, the re-encryption key is transformed into staying in G 2 for the first delegation run by user i (i.e., rk
, g 1/z ]), in G 3 for the second delegation run by user j (i.e., rk
, g 1/z ]), and the last delegation is in G n−1 with re-key rk
n−2→n−1 ∈ G n−1 . We can control the values of u, v and w to obtain a flexible multi-hop system. The deployment of multi-hop re-encryption is shown in Fig. 6 . 
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A first-level ciphertext has the form ct As the computation unidirectional of multilinear map, the first-level ciphertext (stays in G 1 ) will reveal strictly more information than the other level ciphertexts (stays in G k (k ≥ 2)). Thus we only need to prove that the first level ciphertext is provably secure.
Theorem 2: The MUREnc scheme is semantically secure in the standard model under the MDDDH assumption in multilinear groups.
Proof: Assume that there exists an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against the security of MUREnc scheme, we construct an algorithm B to break MDDDH problem with k = n: given an instance tuple [g, g c 1 , g c 2 , Q] to output Q = g 
IV. MODEL OF OBFUSCABLE RE-ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM A. RE-ENCRYPTION FUNCTIONALITY AND CIRCUIT
We now consider how to transform the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc into an obfuscated version O(ReEnc), and run O(ReEnc) to perform the same functionality. More concretely, a re-encryption obfuscator is also considered as a class of circuits that achieving the same functionality of ReEnc, while without revealing the secret key sk i and the message M during the transformation, even he can monitor the memory and obtains all the values during running the program. Additionally, we use the functionality of re-encryption to output the pairs of public keys [pk i , pk j ], with which it converts and re-encrypts the ciphertexts from pk i into pk j . The re-encryption functionality RE(x) is defined as follows:
Remark 6: During the run of Enc(v, pk j , Dec(sk i , x)) in RE() function, it first decrypts the ciphertext x to obtain plaintext M using the secret key sk i , and then re-encrypts the M to pk j . If the executable program of RE(x) can have a whitebox access (i.e., program is controlled by untrusted executor), then we can easily capture the secret key sk i and underlying cleartext M .
Remark 7: In the definition of RE(x), we provide a special input keys that outputs a pair of public keys of delegator pk i and delegatee pk j , which can be considered as the identification of the delegator/delegatee, and will be used in the rerandomization of the input and output.
In the functionality of re-encryption RE(x), the input is x (i.e., described as a ciphertext), and we also need the key [sk i , pk i ] of delegator and the public key pk j of delegatee that are implicitly used in the function evaluation. In order to obtain the key pair [sk i , pk i , pk j ], we define the key generation (access) circuit family as follows:
Let C sk i ,pk i ,pk j be the description of a probabilistic circuit implementing the re-encryption functionality RE(x). We note that all constants in the functionality of re-encryption are hardwired in the circuit description, which can be extracted by gaining access to the description of the circuit.
V. OBFUSCATING RE-ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
In order to provide a secure re-encryption program run by an untrusted server, we will guarantee that the server cannot gain any sensitive information during the perform. (i.e., sensitive sk i and plaintext M will not be revealed to the server. However, as the plaintext is perfectly hidden in the ciphertext due to the semantic security of encryption scheme, and the re-encryption procedure only evaluates on the ciphertexts. Thus we only consider the possible reveal of the secret key.
A. SECURITY MODEL OF OBFUSCATING RE-ENCRYPTION
For an obfuscation of multi-hop re-encryption scheme, we allow an adversary to lean any sensitive information about the secret key when the obfuscated re-encryption is run in an untrusted outsourcing server in a white-box manner. Compared with the traditional re-encryption procedure, we give the stronger attack ability in the obfuscating program, the adversary can monitor the program executing or trace or debug the program. We now give the security model when the adversary is given black-box access to the re-encryption oracle. More concretely, we require the semantic security of both original ciphertext and re-encryption ciphertext, and also the virtual black-box security of re-encrypted ciphertext.
Definition 7: (Semantic Security With Oracle C sk i ,pk i ,pk j ): Let MUREnc be the multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption scheme, and A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be the p.p.t algorithm that the adversary can perform. The scheme MUREnc is semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks under gaining access to circuit oracle C sk i ,pk i ,pk j if the advantage of A defined as below is negligible,
where the experiment IND b,A (λ, β) is defined as follows:
Output 1 if b = b and 0 otherwise. Note that A 1 outputs a valid challenge message pair M 0 and M 1 ∈ M, and A 2 outputs the guess. Here aux denotes the auxiliary information that the adversary can gain in the experiment.
Remark 8: We ensure that both the ciphertext of pk i and pk j are all provably secure. In the indistinguishability experiment IND b,A (λ, β) , we use a flag β to describe that a ciphertext for delegator pk i (β = 0 denotes an original ciphertext) or delegatee pk j (β = 1 denotes a re-encrypted ciphertext), and prove the semantic security of both ciphertexts. Actually, in our construction, the encryption ciphertext of pk i and the re-encryption ciphertext of pk j have the same form and distribution, then we only prove one of them is enough. We use the statistical distance to compute the distribution and show that the adversary's outputs are statistically close.
Definition 8 (Obfuscated Ciphertext Security with Oracle C sk i ,pk i ,pk j ): Let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be the p.p.t algorithm. The scheme MUREnc is secure for transformed ciphertext under gaining access to circuit oracle C sk i ,pk i ,pk j if the advantage of A is negligible
where the experiment tIND A (λ) is defined as follows: Enc(pk i , M b ; rand) into an unintelligent one. We note that, like in ReEnc algorithm, the randomness rand is used to re-randomize the transformed ciphertext. Moreover, we allow the adversary to have access to the delegator's key sk i . That is, the delegator cannot obtain the sensitive information from the obfuscator's output, and thus it achieves the security of re-encryption functionality.
Theorem 3: The encryption scheme MUREnc is semantically secure with oracle C sk i ,pk i ,pk j .
Theorem 4: The encryption scheme MUREnc obtains obfuscated ciphertext security with oracle C sk i ,pk i ,pk j .
Proof: We first note that, in the experiment tIND b,A (λ), the algorithms A C 1 (·) and A C 2 (·) have the black-box oracle access to the circuit C, i.e., only obtains input/output behaviors of the circuit C.
As the circuit C implements the obfuscation of re-encryption algorithm, and then has the same functionality as re-encryption. According to the property of functionality preservation, the obfuscation output obf is computationally indistinguishable from the output of re-encryption ReEnc(ct i , rk i→j ). As the circuit C takes as input a ciphertext generated by semantically secure encryption algorithm Enc, the obfuscated output obf is also indistinguishable for the plaintext M b .
We further consider the case that algorithm A 1 is able to access to sk i . Actually, the output of C is a re-encryption ciphertext of pk j , which is independent to the delegator i. Obtaining the delegator's secret key sk i , it is no use decrypting or distinguishing a re-encrypted ciphertext. That is, the multi-hop re-encryption scheme is forward secure.
B. OBFUSCATOR FOR MULTI-HOP RE-ENCRYPTION
In this section, we present an obfuscator construction for the class of multi-hop and unidirectional re-encryption circuit C λ relative to the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc in the scheme MUREnc.
From the description of re-encryption function RE(x), we can extract a circuit family C sk i ,pk i ,pk j that the keys [sk i = x i , pk i = g x i , pk j = g x j ] can be read from the circuit description. The algorithm of obfuscator MUREncObf is shown in Fig.7 .
The evaluation of obfuscator O pk i ,pk j ,aux (x) gives either a ciphertext ct = [c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ] or a special symbol keys as the input together with random values rand ← {0, 1} 2λ that sampling the variants r and r uniformly from Z p .
Remark 10: Actually, from the view of obfuscator creation, the obfuscator circuit O pk i ,pk j ,aux (x) is produced by the delegator who holds the secret key sk i , and then is distributed to some other (untrusted) party to run the obfuscator to implement the re-encryption without revealing either key sk i .
C. ANALYSIS
In this section, we give the correctness, performance and security analysis of the obfuscator. Obviously, the algorithm MUREncObf satisfies the functionality of transitivemulti-hop re-encryption. That is, it implements the function of RE(x). For the output of obfuscator MUREncObf, it has identical distribution with the output of functionality RE(x) defined in (10) . We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5: The algorithm MUREncObf is an averagecase secure virtual black-box obfuscator for the circuit family C λ .
Proof: By the definition and requirement of obfuscation in Definition 1, we give the correctness of functionality preservation in Lemma 1, efficiency of polynomial slowdown in Lemma 2, and security of average-case virtual black-box in Lemma 3, to satisfy the requirements of the obfuscation.
Lemma 1 (Functionality Preservation): Consider any circuit C sk i ,pk i ,pk j ∈ C λ and let circuit O pk i ,pk j ,aux ← MUREncObf (C sk i ,pk i ,pk j ) be the output of implementing obfuscation algorithm MUREncObf. For any possible input, the MUREncObf algorithm is functionality-preserving for VOLUME 5, 2017 the circuit family C λ with the identical distributions of C sk i ,pk i ,pk j and O pk i ,pk j ,aux .
Proof: We prove the property of functionality preservation by considering the identical output distributions of C sk i ,pk i ,pk j and MUREncObf (C sk i ,pk i ,pk j ) on an input ciphertext x = ct. For a properly generated delegator ciphertext of any message M ∈ M, we observe that ct has the form
for some randomness r ← Z p . When this properly formed ciphertext of message M ∈ M is fed into the obfuscator circuit O pk i ,pk j ,aux , the circuit outputs
for some selected r , r ← Z p . Substitutingr = r + r + r and k = u+v+w, the output of the obfuscator can be rewritten as k, gr k , M · gr n . Obviously, the above distribution is identical to the output of Enc(v, pk i , M ) for all M ∈ M. For a multi-hop ciphertext, the output of obfuscator is also identical to the output of the re-encryption ciphertext.
Lemma 2 (Polynomial Slowdown):
The MUREncObf obfuscator satisfies the polynomial slowdown property.
Proof: Polynomial slowdown is evident: compared with the re-encryption scheme via decrypt-then-encrypt in (10), it is easily to see that the obfuscator MUREncObf is efficient within the polynomial time of the original scheme in that it only calculates a few operations in multilinear maps, and thus the obfuscator follows the efficiency requirement of polynomial slowdown.
Lemma 3 (Average-Case Virtual Black-Box Security): The MUREncObf obfuscator satisfies average-case secure virtual black-box property.
Proof: For simplicity, we write MUREncObf (C) as O(C) for any C ∈ C λ . In order to obtain the property of virtual black-box, we consider an adversary who outputs the code of the obfuscated circuit O(C) for each C ∈ C λ , and then we construct a simulator S C (λ, aux) to achieve a negligible advantage when a distinguisher D C takes as input the obfuscated circuit C (gain access to C) and some auxiliary input aux. That is,
where the probability is taken over the selection of circuit C, the random coins of distinguisher D, obfuscator O and simulator S. At first we give the dummy distinguisher D that outputs whatever is given as input. For a dummy distinguisher D, as the distinguisher cannot access the circuit, then the scheme is reduced as the re-encryption scheme defined in Fig.3 .
We have proved the security for the scheme MUREnc, and then we have the following theorem. 
Proof: Note that in this theorem, D is a dummy distinguisher and cannot gain access to any oracle, then the auxiliary information aux includes only the public information pp. In the above distributions for a same delegation depth u, we have rk 1 = rk 1 = u. Distinguishing the above two distributions is reduced to solve the MDDDH problem, i.e., given two distributions
and decide whether R = g
. Under the assumption MDDDH, the distributions (pk i , pk j , w, u, rk 2 , rk 3 , aux) and (pk i , pk j , w, u, rk 2 , rk 3 , aux) are computationally indistinguishable.
In the obfuscation scheme, the simulator S having access to the circuit C takes as input security parameter λ and some auxiliary string aux, and performs the deployment and response as in Fig. 8 . Notice that the output of circuit description from the simulator S does not correctly calculate the functionality of re-encryption since rk is not a correct re-key (only randomly picked values), and thus the output from the simulator reveals nothing about rk . However, we also indicate that a p.p.t distinguisher D C can not detect this inconsistency.
The virtual black-box security needs the output distribution of the simulator is computationally indistinguishable to the output distribution of obfuscator O even the distinguisher D gaining oracle access to C. In order to show these two distributions are indistinguishable, we define two distributions: Nice(D C , λ, aux) and Junk(D C , λ, aux) as in Fig. 9 .
It is easily to show that the output distribution of Nice(D C , λ, aux) is identical to the obfuscator O, and the output distribution of Junk(D C , λ, aux) is identical to the simulator S, respectively. We have the following lemmas.
Lemma 4: For any aux ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) , any circuit C ∈ C λ , an obfuscation output C ← O(C), and for all p.p.t distinguisher D, there exists
Proof: Lemma 4 is obviously: Nice(D C , λ, aux) initializes the input of re-encryption algorithm, and then obtains the output of the distinguisher D from the obfuscator taking as input a correct re-key and the other parameters. From the view of D, the re-key rk 2 is uniformly distributed in G u since the secret keys sk i and sk j are randomly selected from Z p (|p| = λ). Thus the distribution Nice(D C , λ, aux) is identical to the distribution {D C (C , aux)} λ in which C is an obfuscated re-encryption circuit.
Lemma 5: For any aux ∈ {0, 1} poly(λ) , any circuit C ∈ C λ , an obfuscation output C ← S C (λ, aux), and for all distinguisher D, there exists
Proof: In the Junk game, as the re-keys rk 1 , rk 2 and rk 3 are at random selected from Z n−1 , G u and G 1 respectively, and the output of Junk is identical to the output distribution of simulator S. Actually, these distributions are also identical when taking as ill-formed inputs, for example, u ∈ Z n−1 , w ∈ Z n−1 , and even u + v + w ≥ n − 1.
In order to show the virtual black-box security such that the distinguisher D cannot differ the output of obfuscator O from the output of simulator S, we now need to prove that the distributions of Nice and Junk are indistinguishable in the presence of having oracle to circuit C. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: Under the MDDDH assumption in multilinear groups, for any p.p.t distinguisher D which has ability access to oracle circuit C, and some auxiliary information aux, the following distributions are statistically indistinguishable. i.e., , and the input to D is identically distributed to Junk (D, λ, aux) .
We now consider the distinguisher D C which has access to the re-encryption oracle to circuit C. We define the following probabilities:
where oracle R outputs randomly selected elements for a re-encryption ciphertext. We now continue to prove the probability distributions of ψ(λ, aux) and ϕ(λ, aux) are indistinguishable under the XMDDDH assumption: if a p.p.t algorithm A distinguishes the distributions then there exists an algorithm B to solve the XMDDDH problem with advantage at least
Obtaining an XMDDDH instance
is a valid re-key for the delegator of public key pk i = g c 1 and delegatee of pk j = g c 2 .
B answers the XMDDDH problem with the output with A's distinguish output of ψ(λ, aux) and ϕ(λ, aux). B works as follows:
1) Sample a challenge bit β ∈ {0, 1} randomly, in which β = 0 means to run Nice and β = 1 to run Junk. 
where Q and g 1/c 3 are the elements of instance .
, where oracle O is defined and responded as follows: Response of oracle O: a) Whenever the query is x = keys, return with (pk i , pk j ), and any error occurs then return ∅. Otherwise, proceed with the following: 
VI. PERFORMANCE
The candidate realization of multilinear maps was first proposed by Garg et al. (namely GGH framework) [16] . Later, the improvement was presented by Langlois et al. (GGHLite framework) to offer smaller parameter sizes [26] . Compared with leveled multilinear maps in this work that encoding is deterministic, the encoding of candidate multilinear maps proposed by Garg et al. [16] is randomized in GGH framework, which means that it is not trivial to test whether two strings encode the same element. The additional test should be provided in GGH framework. Reference [1] provides a more efficient implementation of multilinear maps in ideal lattice primitives.
A. GRADED ENCODING SYSTEM
GGH's n-graded encoding system is constructed as follows: Considering our scheme in GGH framework, for any i-th group G i (i ∈ [n]) of prime order p, we consider the ring Z p . For an element α ∈ Z p , we can consider αg i as the ''encoding'' of α in G i . We denote this encoding by enc i (α). Note that this encoding is easy to compute but hard to invert. The multilinear map allows us to implement n encodings {enc i (α i )} i∈ [n] ,α i ∈Z p . Graded encoding schemes give a similar functionality, albeit with randomized and noisy encodings, and with a procedure for testing equality of encoded elements in the final group G n . From the GGH framework, the size of public parameters is O(n 3 λ 5 log(nλ)) and the size of group elements is O(n 2 λ 3 ). From the GGHLite framework, the size of public parameter is O(n 3 λ log 2 (nλ)) and the size of group elements is O(n 2 λ log 2 (nλ)). In our scheme, every level ciphertext (different hop) has the same size. The computation cost is decided by the number operation of multilinear map. In proposed obfuscation scheme, it only needs 3 pairing operations and 4 product operations in multilinear group.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we designed an obfuscator for re-encryption program that supports flexible, controllable and transitive multi-hop, in which we can deploy the program obfuscator run on a (malicious) untrusted sever, while no sensitive information was revealed even the server traces into the program or monitors the breakpoint. We constructed the concrete scheme and its obfuscated version. We also provided several deployments and scenarios for our scheme, and demonstrated that our scheme supports flexible and controllable re-encryption delegation.
Compared with related schemes, our proposed scheme is obfuscatable, which protects the re-encryption algorithm from trace-into attack and white-box access in case that computing platform is controlled by the attackers. We point out the interesting directions for the future: 1) Our scheme supports obfuscation for unidirectional re-encryption algorithm, which can be used in multihop and unidirectional delegation. May we construct an obfuscation for bidirectional multi-hop? For example, using an untrusted server/router help to transfer the encrypted message in two-way communications. Actually, bidirectional multi-hop delegation will form a bidirectional delegation chain, which can not explicitly construct in multilinear map since this map is unidirectional. 2) From the viewpoint of efficiency, Zimmerman [35] indicated that using clean multilinear maps and fully homomorphic encryption scheme, all circuits could be obfuscated directly, without the need for bootstrapping However, it is inefficient in practice. We focus on the practical obfuscation for concrete functionality, re-encryption, to give a better balance of security and efficiency. Important future work would be to improve the efficiency to run on lightweight devices such as smartphone, Internet-of-Things and so on. 
